Several other cases have been reported in which hippocampal damage significantly impaired remembering

but not imagining. For instance, Maguire and colleagues reported that adult amnesic patients who had sustained hippocampal damage early in life are able to construct imaginary scenarios (Maguire et al., 2010; Hurley et al., 2011; but see, Kwan et al., 2010), and they also report normal imagination abilities in children with hippocampal damage and autobiographical memory deficits (Cooper et al., 2011). These findings Ion Channel Ligand Library purchase suggest that the time of onset of the amnesia could be an important factor: perhaps patients who suffer early damage develop other strategies or rely either on residual episodic memories or detailed semantic information to construct imaginary scenarios (Cooper et al., 2011). Note also that although Hassabis et al. (2007b) reported that four adult amnesic patients had severe difficulties imagining scenarios, they did

report that one adult amnesic could INCB28060 cost perform their scene construction task normally. They observed that this patient is characterized by the presence of residual right hippocampal tissue, and have recently reported fMRI evidence showing activation of the right hippocampus

when the patient performed a scene construction task (Mullally et al., 2012; see also, Maguire et al., 2010). Overall, it seems clear that there are some cases in which hippocampal damage differentially affects memory and imagination, but it is not yet well understood why differential effects are observed in some cases while parallel effects are observed in others. At a more general level, given that both cognitive and neural differences between remembering and imagining have been established, it will be important for theoretical accounts to attempt to explain these differences. Ideas such as scene construction (Hassabis and Maguire, 2007, 2009) and self-projection (Buckner Thymidine kinase and Carroll, 2007) have focused on explaining what is common to remembering, imagining, and related processes. We noted earlier that the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter and Addis, 2007a, 2007b, 2009) addresses some of the differences that have been documented (see also Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007), but developing more detailed theoretical accounts aimed at handling the differences between remembering and imagining reviewed in this section constitutes a critical task.